Back Matter

Each entry opens with a bracketed key, [Author Year], and the body cites by the same key: either the key itself where a work, dataset, institution, or case is named, or a linked year where the prose already reads “Author (Year).” Both forms are hyperlinks to the entry. Keys carry letter suffixes where one author has several items in a year, in the order listed here. Entries are grouped by the part of the argument they serve, not alphabetically. Entries marked landscape reference document the state of the field the thesis is positioned against and carry no body key; every other entry is cited at least once.

Theory & Framing

[Davidson & Rees-Mogg 1997] Davidson, J. D., & Rees-Mogg, W. (1997). The Sovereign Individual: How to Survive and Thrive During the Collapse of the Welfare State. New York: Simon & Schuster / Touchstone. https://www.simonandschuster.ca/books/The-Sovereign-Individual/James-Dale-Davidson/9780684832722. Cited in Chapter 1: Introduction for the prediction that networked computation erodes centralized control and provokes capital controls and nationalization. Framing only; no quantity or forecast is adopted.

[Booth 2020] Booth, J. (2020). The Price of Tomorrow: Why Deflation is the Key to an Abundant Future. Stanley Press. https://thepriceoftomorrow.com/. Cited in Chapter 11: Compute Through the “AI Money” Lens for technological deflation as a secular force on unit compute cost. Framing, not measurement.

[McLuhan 1964] McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: McGraw-Hill. https://archive.org/details/understandingmed0000mclu. Cited for framing only: that a medium’s structural effects arrive as externalities of adoption rather than as features anyone selects, and that the content of a new medium is initially the old medium’s content. Used in Chapter 2: The Failure of Soft Guarantees and the Executive Memo as pattern, not as evidence; no claim of this thesis depends on it, and nothing in it is offered as measurement.

[McLuhan 1962] McLuhan, M. (1962). The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. https://archive.org/details/gutenberggalaxym0000mclu. Cited for the sensorium framing—that a medium restructures the ratio of the senses before anyone notices—and for print’s restructuring of the private reader. Same limits as above: synthesis, not experiment; mechanism, not quantities.

[Eisenstein 1979] Eisenstein, E. L. (1979). The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/printing-press-as-an-agent-of-change/7DC19878AB937940DE13075FE839BDBA. Cited in Chapter 2: The Failure of Soft Guarantees for the standardization thesis: that typographic uniformity preceded and enabled the standardization of physical production, and that print’s consequences were causal and profound. It is cited for mechanism only. The thesis does not adopt any necessity claim—that the industrial revolution was possible only because of movable type—and no argument here rests on one.

[Ong 1982] Ong, W. J. (1982). Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. London: Methuen. https://archive.org/details/oralityliteracyt00ongw. Cited for interiority: that sustained silent reading is a technology-dependent practice and the basis of the private self as an epistemic unit. Used in Chapter 9: Privacy as Private Money to place private settlement in a longer arc. Framing only; the thesis’s claim about payments as the load-bearing privacy surface is unchanged by it.

[Anderson 1983] Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. https://archive.org/details/imaginedcommunit0000ande_s3l3. Cited for one connection only: that print created mass simultaneous identity, and that the Native Monetary Buyer Map is how a monetary constituency renders itself legible to itself. The analogy is structural; no claim about adoption is derived from it.

[Culkin 1967] Culkin, J. M., S.J. (1967, March 18). A Schoolman’s Guide to Marshall McLuhan. The Saturday Review, pp. 51–53, 71–72. http://www.unz.org/Pub/SaturdayRev-1967mar18-00051. Open copy: https://webspace.royalroads.ca/llefevre/wp-content/uploads/sites/258/2017/08/A-Schoolmans-Guide-to-Marshall-McLuhan-1.pdf. Cited for attribution: “We become what we behold. We shape our tools and thereafter they shape us” is Culkin’s line, routinely misattributed to McLuhan. It appears in this thesis, if at all, as Culkin’s.

[Perez 2002] Perez, C. (2002). Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781005323. Cited for one mechanism only: that the installation phase of an infrastructure buildout is financed by structures that outrun the productive economy’s ability to absorb them, and that the resulting clearing event reprices the installed base — transferring it from weakly financed owners to stronger users at lower capital cost — which is what makes the deployment phase’s cheap substrate. Used in Chapter 29: Adoption Curve & Ecosystem Dynamics (the capital cycle as a cross-cutting clock on the four states), Chapter 29: Adoption Curve & Ecosystem Dynamics (the window closing by event rather than accrual), Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? and Chapter 11: Compute Through the “AI Money” Lens (financial repricing as a deflation channel distinct from technological deflation), Chapter 29: Adoption Curve & Ecosystem Dynamics (the fee base as a deployment-phase quantity), and Chapter 33: The Closed Sovereign Stack (the rescue-born pathway to State 4). The thesis does not adopt the historical periodization (irruption/Frenzy/Turning Point/Synergy/Maturity as dated phases), does not claim AI constitutes a “sixth revolution” or adopt Perez’s own current reading of AI as a third boost to the ICT surge, does not use the framework to forecast any asset, sector, or macro variable, and no red line, threshold, or falsification condition depends on it. Where the frame and the thesis’s instruments conflict, the instruments govern.

[Gorton & Pennacchi 1990] Gorton, G., & Pennacchi, G. (1990). Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation. The Journal of Finance, 45(1), 49–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05080.x. Cited in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? for one mechanism: that a security can be designed so that no counterparty gains from producing private information about it, and that such a security circulates at par for that reason. Mechanism only; no magnitude and no claim about bank liabilities is imported, and no result of this thesis depends on the model.

[Dang et al. 2020] Dang, T. V., Gorton, G., & Holmström, B. (2020). The Information View of Financial Crises. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 12, 39–65. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-012820-025249. Cited in preference to the widely circulated but undated “Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises” working-paper lineage from which it derives, because a citation record should not rest on a moving target. Cited for the information-insensitivity account of debt: that the money-like security is the one whose payoff is least sensitive to private information, and that a run is the transition from information-insensitive to information-sensitive rather than a revision of fundamentals. Mechanism only. The thesis explicitly does not adopt the corollary that opacity is required — Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? argues an opposite route to the same property — and that departure is this thesis’s claim, not theirs, and carries its own falsifier.

[Holmström 2015] Holmström, B. (2015). Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System. BIS Working Paper No. 479. https://www.bis.org/publ/work479.htm. Cited for the “no questions asked” formulation and for the position that opacity is a design feature of money markets rather than a defect. Used as the statement of the view Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? inverts; the inversion is ours and is falsifiable through Red Line 17.

[Gorton & Metrick 2012] Gorton, G., & Metrick, A. (2012). Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(3), 425–451. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.016. Cited for one empirical characterization: that the 2007–2009 funding collapse ran through collateral quality and haircuts rather than through a revision of fundamentals participants did not already hold. Used to identify which informational margin failed. One descriptive range from it — structured-collateral repo haircuts rising from near zero to 40–45% — is quoted for illustration in Red Line 17; no red-line threshold depends on it, and no other quantity from it enters this thesis, and the analogy is to the margin, not to the setting.

[Menger 1892] Menger, K. (1892). On the Origin of Money. The Economic Journal, 2(6), 239–255. Translated by C. A. Foley. https://doi.org/10.2307/2956146. Free full text: https://mises.org/library/book/origins-money. Cited in Chapter 35: Why a Base Asset Behind These Could Become Money for the saleability account of commodity money: that money arises without design when the most saleable good comes to be accepted for its saleability rather than its use, and that the path runs use-value $\to$ saleability $\to$ general acceptance. Used to correct an earlier overstatement that no asset had crossed from use-value to money, and to state that the empty base rate is for equity-like claims on a fee stream specifically. Menger’s account is treated as an argument for the possibility of the path this thesis proposes, not as evidence that any particular asset will take it.

[Mises 1912] Mises, L. von (1912/1953). The Theory of Money and Credit. Translated by H. E. Batson. New Haven: Yale University Press (original German edition 1912). https://mises.org/library/book/theory-money-and-credit. Cited in Chapter 35: Why a Base Asset Behind These Could Become Money for the regression theorem only: that a money’s present purchasing power traces back to a prior exchange value it held as a commodity. Used alongside Menger (1892) to fix the scope of the base-rate claim. No quantity, forecast, or policy position from the work is adopted, and the thesis does not rely on its broader monetary theory.

[Doepke & Schneider 2017] Doepke, M., & Schneider, M. (2017). Money as a Unit of Account. Econometrica, 85(5), 1537–1574. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13541. Cited in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? for one mechanism: that the choice of unit of account is a coordination problem embedded in contract networks, and therefore exhibits inertia that portfolio choices do not. Used for stickiness and strategic complementarity; no result, magnitude, or welfare claim is imported, and the thesis’s denomination instrument is not derived from the model.

[Grossman & Stiglitz 1980] Grossman, S. J., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1980). On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets. The American Economic Review, 70(3), 393–408. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805228. Cited in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? for one structural result: that costly information cannot be fully reflected in prices, because an agent who earns no return on producing it will not produce it. Used to state an objection to this thesis’s own mechanism, and to identify what answers it — that a proof system separates the party bearing the cost from the parties consuming the result, so the expenditure is voluntary rather than rent-financed. No model, magnitude, or efficiency claim is imported; this thesis takes no position on market efficiency, and the noise-trader apparatus of the paper plays no role here.

[Baumol 1982] Baumol, W. J. (1982). Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure. The American Economic Review, 72(1), 1–15. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1808571. Cited in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? and Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? for one mechanism only: that the credible possibility of entry can discipline conduct without any entry being observed. Used as the structural analogue for verification that is continuously available and almost never exercised; at the fork it is applied to the open stack as a credible entrant that can discipline incumbents’ rents without taking share. No result about industry structure, sunk costs, contestability’s empirical standing, or welfare is imported, and no threshold in this thesis is derived from it.

[Teece 1986] Teece, D. J. (1986). Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy. Research Policy, 15(6), 285–305. https://doi.org/10.1016/0048-7333(86)90027-2. Cited in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? and Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? for one mechanism only, stated in its abstract: that when imitation is easy, the profits from an innovation may accrue to the owners of complementary assets rather than to the developers of the intellectual property. Used to name who earns the return on an open protocol: its own coordination assets at the fork, and the custody and distribution that wrappers own. Read: the abstract and the opening section (pp. 285–286). No result about integration, licensing, appropriability regimes, dominant designs, or trade policy is imported, and no threshold in this thesis is derived from it.

[Coase 1937] Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x. Cited in Chapter 7: The Delegation Economy: Who Buys Verification for one mechanism only: that the boundary of the firm sits where organizing a transaction internally costs as much as using the market. Verification cost is read as one such transaction cost. No other result is imported, and no threshold in this thesis is derived from it.

[Barzel 1982] Barzel, Y. (1982). Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets. Journal of Law and Economics, 25(1), 27–48. https://doi.org/10.1086/467005. Cited in Chapter 7: The Delegation Economy: Who Buys Verification for one mechanism only: that when the attributes of what is traded are costly to measure, markets grow arrangements to economize on measuring them, such as warranties, packaging, product ratings, and certification, which would be superfluous if product information were costless (pp. 27–28). $r(W)$ is read as that measurement cost for machine work. No result about any particular market is imported.

[Manidis & Roberts 2026] Manidis, W., & Roberts, J. (2026, October 29). The Commanding Heights. Web edition. https://commanding-heights.com. Cited as a position: in Chapter 34: Objections & Responses for the case for owning a durable toll, a scarce, controllable position whose revenue grows with the nominal value of the activity passing through it; in Chapter 32: Kardashev Labs: Build and Measure, where the base asset is asked whether it is one; and in Chapter 29: Adoption Curve & Ecosystem Dynamics for the account of diffusion in which the installed base is the position worth holding. No quantity or forecast is taken from it.

[Kaldor 1939] Kaldor, N. (1939). Speculation and Economic Stability. The Review of Economic Studies, 7(1), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.2307/2967593. Cited in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? for one general mechanism only: that a service flow accruing to the holder of a physical good, rather than to the holder of a claim on it, can carry a price a cash-flow model does not reproduce. It is not cited for gold, which is a near-zero-convenience-yield commodity whose price residual is conventionally attributed to monetary and portfolio demand rather than to storage convenience; and it is not a claim that a triad asset is a storage commodity. No magnitude in this thesis derives from it.

[Working 1949] Working, H. (1949). The Theory of Price of Storage. The American Economic Review, 39(6), 1254–1262. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1816601. Companion to Kaldor, cited for the same mechanism and subject to the same limits: the storage-theory account of convenience yield in consumption commodities, where the service flow is an option against stockout. The analogy in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? is to the mechanism, not to the setting.

Market Structure, Flows & Inelastic Markets

[Green 2026a] Green, M. W. (2026, July 26). A Semi-Theory of Almost Everything: Who Was Actually Setting Semiconductor Prices This Spring? Tier1 Alpha. Paywalled. https://www.yesigiveafig.com/p/a-semi-theory-of-almost-everything. The flow-elasticity, holder-recycling, and leveraged-rebalancing machinery in Appendix H: Formal Model of Market Realization, Wrapper Flows, and Price Capture is adapted from this work; the generalization to monetary telemetry is ours, as are any errors in it. The daily-reset rebalancing identity and the volatility-drag result that the appendix builds on are older than this essay and are cited to Cheng & Madhavan (2009) and Avellaneda & Zhang (2010) below.

[Nakamoto 2008] Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. Cited for the proof-of-work construction that mints digital scarcity from hash puzzles and for the seventeen-year record the thesis uses as the control case throughout.

[Shannon 1948] Shannon, C. E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System Technical Journal, 27(3), 379–423; 27(4), 623–656. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1948.tb01338.x. Cited once, in the introduction’s Bell Labs framing: the canonical case of an institution turning theory into deployed infrastructure.

[Green 2026b] Green, M. W. (2026, August 16). Anchors Aweigh, My Boys. “Yes, I give a fig…” (Substack). Paywalled. https://www.yesigiveafig.com/p/anchors-aweigh-my-boys. The automatic-versus-marginal buyer distinction, the observation that market-value-weighted bond indexes absorb less DV01 per dollar after a selloff, and the claim that the quality of long-duration demand has deteriorated are drawn from this work and used in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives, Chapter 26: Extended Telemetry, and Chapter 26: Extended Telemetry. Commentary rather than peer-reviewed research; used for mechanism, not for quantities. Tactical claims and the attribution of any particular yield move uniquely to duration withdrawal are listed and excluded in Appendix I: Scenario Analysis: The Collateral Loop Under Stress.

[Green 2026c] Green, M. W. (2026, May 24). What the Treasury Needs. “Yes, I give a fig…” (Substack). Paywalled. https://www.yesigiveafig.com/p/what-the-treasury-needs. Used selectively for the distinction among market repair, fiscal management, financial repression, and administrative enclosure, and for the proposition that policy can change duration-bearing capacity without erasing economic loss. Commentary rather than peer-reviewed research; used for mechanism, not for the proposal’s illustrative quantities or for a claim that any facility is necessary.

[Green 2026d] Green, M. W. (2026, August 19). Sometimes, You Get What You Need. “Yes, I give a fig…” (Substack). Paywalled. https://www.yesigiveafig.com/p/sometimes-you-get-what-you-need. Used as a scenario-framing example for the market-repair branch in Chapter 29: Adoption Curve & Ecosystem Dynamics. Its tactical sequence for rates, currencies, gold, mortgages, and equities is quarantined rather than adopted as forecast.

[Green 2026e] Green, M. W. (2026, August 30). The Vibecession Was Real. “Yes, I give a fig…” (Substack). Paywalled. https://www.yesigiveafig.com/p/the-vibecession-was-real. Used for mechanism, not quantities: the dollar-weighted versus person-weighted aggregation distinction and its covariance identity (adopted as the representation discipline on board aggregates, Chapter 26: Extended Telemetry); the price-level-versus-inflation-process-versus-balance-sheet-hysteresis decomposition and the consumption-through-depletion mechanism (adopted in the household-transmission observables of Chapter 29: Adoption Curve & Ecosystem Dynamics and the exhaustion gradient of Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives); the state-versus-household resilience distinction $R_{\text{state}} \neq R_{\text{household}}$ and the formal operating-surplus/resilience-stock model (adopted in Chapter 33: The Closed Sovereign Stack); and the lived-solvency framing behind the incumbency objection (Chapter 34: Objections & Responses). Commentary rather than peer-reviewed research. Excluded: the essay’s illustrative simulation percentages (presented there as mathematical possibility, not prevalence), its pricing-power magnitudes (anecdotal), any psychological attribution to named officials, and its secondary statistics, which are treated as provisional pending tracing to underlying series.

[Green 2026f] Green, M. W. (2026). The Quiet Turning. “Yes, I give a fig…” (Substack). Paywalled. https://www.yesigiveafig.com/p/the-quiet-turning. Used for one observation and two objections, each of which reads against this thesis rather than for it. The observation: that cheap checking routinely goes unperformed — the record public, the analysis absent — which refuted the original “everyone has already looked” formulation of Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? and forced its restatement as deterrence on the claimant rather than audit by the counterparty. The objections: that the free-rider structure of costly information applies to honesty as it does to prices, and that discovery without consequence changes nothing. The first is answered in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? from the separation between the party bearing the cost of proof and the parties consuming it; the second is instrumented as the plain-language reading of Red Line 14 (Chapter 30: Risk Analysis & Failure Modes). What is not drawn from this work: the contestability framing that replaces the retracted formulation is cited to Baumol (1982) and the free-rider structure to Grossman & Stiglitz (1980); the monetary consequence, the adversarial-invariance claim, the scope bound on computable claims, and the synthesis of any of it with the collateral literature are this thesis’s own and are endorsed by no one. Commentary rather than peer-reviewed research, and published behind a paywall — which is why no argument here rests on it: every mechanism it prompted is carried by an independently citable source a reader can open. Excluded: its fraud aggregates, which are self-reported, overlap across FTC and IC3 collection, and are not summable, a limitation the essay states itself; its generational characterization, which is anecdotal; and its attributions of motive to named individuals and firms.

[Green 2026g] Green, M. W. (2026, September 20). The Market Has a Rule of Its Own: Before the Fed Reads the Long End as a Message, It Should Identify Who Is Speaking. “Yes, I give a fig…” (Substack). Paywalled. https://www.yesigiveafig.com/p/the-market-has-a-rule-of-its-own. Used in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives for one formulation—description becomes instruction: a market-value-weighted index reports the market, and once capital is managed against it the report becomes the order—with its corollary that the seller of credit comes to determine the portfolio of the buyer. The decomposition Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? describes—net demand for Treasury interest-rate risk by tenor, in DV01, by buyer and decision rule, with a published residual—is the one the essay asks the Board to run. The mechanism itself is cited to the two staff papers the essay rests on ([Barth et al. 2024], [Kruttli et al. 2021]) rather than to the essay. Commentary; mechanism, not quantities. No figure from the essay is used. Excluded and listed in Appendix I: Scenario Analysis: The Collateral Loop Under Stress: the closing claim that mandate-followers and their arbitrageurs are the market’s dominant voice, which the essay’s own proposed decomposition has not yet tested; and any attribution of a policy move or a yield level to the mechanism. Seven essays by one commentator are drawn on in this document, and the reader should weigh that. The rule applied to all seven: an essay is cited where the thesis first adopts one of its constructs, in the quarantine table where its claims are held back, and in Appendix J: What Changed Across Releases where it prompted a revision; everywhere else the text points to its own section. No essay is used for a quantity or a forecast.

[Gabaix & Koijen 2021] Gabaix, X., & Koijen, R. S. J. (2021). In Search of the Origins of Financial Fluctuations: The Inelastic Markets Hypothesis. NBER Working Paper No. 28967. https://www.nber.org/papers/w28967. Cited for the inelastic-markets premise that flows move prices at all, not for the market-impact function used in Appendix H: Formal Model of Market Realization, Wrapper Flows, and Price Capture; that square-root form comes from the market-microstructure execution-impact literature.

[Cheng & Madhavan 2009] Cheng, M., & Madhavan, A. (2009). The Dynamics of Leveraged and Inverse Exchange-Traded Funds. Journal of Investment Management, 7(4), 43–62. https://joim.com/article/the-dynamics-of-leveraged-and-inverse-exchange-traded-funds/. Preprint: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1393995. Cited in Appendix H: Formal Model of Market Realization, Wrapper Flows, and Price Capture for the daily-reset rebalancing identity — that a fund with leverage $L$ must trade $L(L-1)$ times its assets times the underlying return to restore target exposure, and that this holds for inverse as well as long leverage — and for the observation that both long and inverse leveraged funds therefore trade in the direction of the underlying move. The recycling boundary and the Wrapper Recycling Ratio built on that identity are ours.

[Avellaneda & Zhang 2010] Avellaneda, M., & Zhang, S. (2010). Path-Dependence of Leveraged ETF Returns. SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics, 1(1), 586–603. https://doi.org/10.1137/090760805. Cited in Appendix H: Formal Model of Market Realization, Wrapper Flows, and Price Capture for the continuous-time expression of a daily-reset leveraged fund’s compound return in terms of the underlying’s return and realized variance — the source of the $-L^{2}\sigma^{2}/2$ variance penalty and of the statement that the terminal value is path-dependent. The financing and expense terms added there, and the classification consequence drawn in Chapter 8: The Triad and the Monetary Candidate, are ours.

[Messari 2024–26] Messari. (2024–2026). Protocol revenue and token issuance series for Filecoin, Render, Akash, Golem, and Livepeer. Messari analytics dashboards. https://messari.io/project/filecoin. Cited in Chapter 34: Objections & Responses as one of the two public sources for the observation that native fee revenue on the closest utility-token precedents has covered low single digits of issuance. Dashboard series, not audited financials; the ratio depends on each dashboard’s classification of fees, burns, and incentive emissions, and the thesis relies on the order of magnitude only.

[Chainalysis 2024] Chainalysis. (2024, October). The 2024 Geography of Cryptocurrency Report. https://www.chainalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/the-2024-geography-of-crypto-report-release.pdf. Cited in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? for one qualitative finding: that in the emerging-market currency episodes it documents (Argentina, Turkey, Nigeria), dollar stablecoins rather than bitcoin or privacy assets were the instrument of savings flight and cross-border settlement. Industry analytics, not audited data; used for the direction of revealed preference, not for any volume figure.

[Chainalysis 2020] Chainalysis. (2020, June). 60% of Bitcoin Is Held Long Term as Digital Gold. What About the Rest? Chainalysis blog. https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/bitcoin-market-data-exchanges-trading/. Cited in Chapter 12: Work Credits: Reserved Service Claims for the estimate that 2.3–3.7 million bitcoin have not moved in five years or more and are treated as lost. Used to anchor a modelling assumption by loose analogy only; the thesis’s 1%-per-year figure is not derived from it.

[Token Terminal 2024–26] Token Terminal. (2024–2026). Fees, revenue, and token incentives series for Filecoin, Render, Akash, Golem, and Livepeer. Token Terminal analytics dashboards. https://tokenterminal.com/explorer/markets/depin. Cited in Chapter 34: Objections & Responses alongside Messari for the same observation and under the same caveat. Where the two dashboards disagree, the thesis does not adjudicate; it states the order of magnitude both support.

Energy, Industrial Capacity & Sovereign Optionality

[Doomberg 2026a] Doomberg. (2026, July 29). Fire Horse: analysis of Chinese energy strategy, coal, refining, conversion capacity, and stockpiling. Doomberg (Substack). Paywalled. https://newsletter.doomberg.com/p/fire-horse. Used in Chapter 33: The Closed Sovereign Stack to characterize a strategy of conversion optionality and “resilience over efficiency.” This is an analyst presentation, not peer-reviewed work; figures cited are its accounting rather than independent measurement, and no claim in this thesis is load-bearing on them.

[Doomberg 2026b] Doomberg. (2026, August 9). Endangered Specious. Doomberg (Substack). Paywalled. https://newsletter.doomberg.com/p/endangered-specious. Used selectively for the mechanism that gross feedstock is not deliverable output when conversion capacity is the binding cut. Commentary rather than peer-reviewed research; used to motivate the Topological Scarcity Lemma and DVC, not for article-specific quantities or a conclusion that aggregate abundance guarantees local resilience.

[Doomberg 2026c] Doomberg. (2026, August 13). A Minor Detail. Doomberg (Substack). Paywalled. https://newsletter.doomberg.com/p/a-minor-detail. Used selectively as a stress scenario illustrating common-cause dependence across fuel, logistics, cooling water, and generation. The geopolitical sequence is not treated as a base case or tactical forecast, and no unsourced quantity enters the model.

[Doomberg 2026d] Doomberg. (2026, August 18). Over Target. Doomberg (Substack). Paywalled. https://newsletter.doomberg.com/p/over-target. Used selectively for the principal–agent mechanism in the Sponsor Dependency Board: a subsidized operator and its sponsor may have different terminal objectives. Claims about the intent behind any particular attack or escalation path are not adopted.

[Gromen 2025–26] Gromen, L. The Forest for the Trees (FFTT LLC). FFTT research notes, 2025–2026 (paywalled); specific issues cited in text. Three framings are drawn from this work: sovereign debt as a claim on future real surplus, with monetary credibility jointly determined by productive capacity and the state’s ability to mobilize it (Chapter 33: The Closed Sovereign Stack); the reflexive dependence of fiscal capacity on collateral values (Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives); and the reshoring trilemma (Chapter 33: The Closed Sovereign Stack). Commentary rather than peer-reviewed research; used for framing, not for quantities. Quantitative claims from the same source that could not be verified are listed and excluded in Appendix I: Scenario Analysis: The Collateral Loop Under Stress. https://fftt-llc.com/.

[NERC annual] North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). (annual). Long-Term Reliability Assessment. Atlanta, GA: NERC. https://www.nerc.com. Cited in Chapter 17: Layer 0: Verifiable Machines & Energy as the regulatory anchor of the resource-adequacy literature: the standing, published assessment of how much reserve capacity the North American grid carries against demand and how that margin is trending. The thesis imports the framing — redundancy priced against the cost of idle capacity, and resilience that is not metered becoming rent — not any figure, and the FCR/DVC instruments are its own.

[IEA 2025] International Energy Agency (IEA). (2025). Energy and AI. Paris: IEA. Licence: CC BY 4.0. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai. Cited in Chapter 5: Threat Model for one estimate, quoted from the report’s executive summary (https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai/executive-summary, read 30 October 2026): with grids “already under strain in many places”, “unless these risks are addressed, around 20% of planned data centre projects could be at risk of delays.” The estimate is the agency’s, conditional on the risks it names, and counts projects rather than capacity; the thesis uses it as context for queue position as an instrument, not as a forecast of its own, and no threshold or red line depends on it.

Note on the synthesis. The layered reading in Chapter 33: The Closed Sovereign Stack—physical throughput beneath sovereign balance sheet beneath market realization beneath verification—is our construction, assembled from the above together with the market-structure sources in the preceding section. Sovereign Optionality adapts pathway diversity to facility and network scale; Delivered Verified Capacity restores the conversion-throughput term as scenario-specific service max flow. The Topological Scarcity Lemma, Pressure–Capacity Corridor, and their application to AfterFiat are our synthesis. Errors in that adaptation are ours.

[Bessent 2026] Bessent, S. (2026, June 23). American Economic Statecraft in the 21st Century. Remarks at the Economic Club of New York’s America 250 Gala Dinner. U.S. Department of the Treasury, press release sb0539. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0539. A primary source, cited in Chapter 33: The Closed Sovereign Stack for stated doctrine only. Quotations are verbatim. A policy speech is evidence of intent and framing, not of outcomes, and this document draws no inference from it about what will actually be built.

[Kimi Team 2026] Kimi Team. (2026). Kimi K3: Open Frontier Intelligence. arXiv:2607.24653. https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.24653. Cited in Chapter 33: The Closed Sovereign Stack for a single narrow proposition: that openly released weights have approached the proprietary frontier closely enough to matter economically. The paper reports the model trailing the strongest proprietary systems overall, and that qualification travels with the citation. No claim about inference pricing is drawn from it.

[Google Cloud 2026] Google Cloud. (2026). VM instance pricing. Compute Engine price list. https://cloud.google.com/products/compute/pricing. A vendor price list, read on 30 October 2026; the page carries no date. Cited in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? for the quoting unit only: “Prices on this page are listed in U.S. dollars (USD)”, and a customer who pays in another currency is charged the prices listed in that currency on Cloud Platform SKUs. No price is drawn from it.

[Alibaba Cloud 2026] Alibaba Cloud. (2026, October 29). Model Studio: Model inference pricing. Alibaba Cloud Documentation Center, international site. https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/model-studio/model-pricing. A vendor price list, last updated 29 October 2026 and read on 30 October 2026. Cited in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? for the quoting unit only: prices for the Qwen models are stated in US dollars per million tokens, for the China (Beijing) region as for the others. No price is drawn from it.

[DeepSeek 2026] DeepSeek. (2026). Models & Pricing. DeepSeek API Docs. https://api-docs.deepseek.com/quick_start/pricing. Chinese-language version: https://api-docs.deepseek.com/zh-cn/quick_start/pricing. A vendor price list, read on 30 October 2026; the page carries no date. Cited in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? for the quoting unit only: the English-language list states its prices with a dollar sign and no currency code. The Chinese-language list states the same models’ prices in yuan, so the citation is to the English-language list as the international quote. No price is drawn from it, and DeepSeek reserves the right to adjust its prices.

Macro: Debt, Financial Repression, Real Yields

[Gaspar et al. 2025] Gaspar, V., Gonçalves, C. E., & Poplawski-Ribeiro, M. (2025, September 17). Global Debt Remains Above 235% of World GDP. IMF Blog / Global Debt Monitor. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2025/09/17/global-debt-remains-above-235-of-world-gdp. Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives for the headline global debt-to-GDP multiple only.

[IMF 2025] International Monetary Fund. (2025). Global Debt Monitor 2025. IMF Global Debt Database. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/GDD. Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives as the dataset behind the debt figures; no projection beyond those stated in the text is adopted.

[IMF 2024] International Monetary Fund. (2024, October). Fiscal Monitor, October 2024: Putting a Lid on Public Debt. IMF. Series page: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM. [Reports global public debt exceeding $100 trillion in 2024, approaching 100% of global GDP by the end of the decade; cited in Part I for the headline stock figure. Superseded for the ratio projections by the April 2026 edition below.] Cited for the stock figure only.

[IMF 2026] International Monetary Fund. (2026, April). Fiscal Monitor, April 2026. IMF. Series page: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM. [Reports global public debt at just under 94% of GDP in 2025, projected to reach 100% by 2029.] Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives for the public-debt ratio and its end-of-decade projection; an official projection, quoted as such.

[Reinhart & Sbrancia 2015] Reinhart, C. M., & Sbrancia, M. B. (2015). The Liquidation of Government Debt. IMF Working Paper 15/7. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1507.pdf. Source of the “liquidation effect” construction used in Appendix A: Formal Model of Verification Asymmetry & VerifyPrice, Definition 7: the annual real transfer from bondholders to the sovereign when real rates are held negative, and its historical size in advanced economies over 1945–1980.

[Barth et al. 2025] Barth, D., Beltran, D., Hoops, J., Kahn, R. J., Liu, Z., & Perozek, M. (2025, October 15). The Cross-Border Trail of the Treasury Basis Trade. FEDS Notes. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Series: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/. [The three figures this thesis relies on: Cayman-domiciled hedge funds’ Treasury holdings of roughly $1.85 trillion at end-2024; an understatement of hedge-fund Treasury holdings in the TIC data of roughly $1.4 trillion; and a resulting overstatement of the U.S. household saving rate of roughly 2.1 percentage points over 2023–24.] Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives for the scale and financing of Cayman-domiciled hedge-fund Treasury positions and for the resulting mismeasurement in the TIC data and the Financial Accounts. Staff research, not a Board policy position. The note itself cautions that the reported gap is not attributable solely to the cash–futures basis trade, and that caution is reproduced in the main text.

[Barth et al. 2024] Barth, D., Kahn, R. J., Monin, P., & Sokolinskiy, O. (2024, June). Reaching for Duration and Leverage in the Treasury Market. Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2024-039. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/reaching-for-duration-and-leverage-in-the-treasury-market.htm. [The findings this thesis relies on: variation in mutual funds’ Treasury-futures positions drives much of the time-series variation in aggregate Treasury-futures open interest, including more than sixty percent of the rise examined; those positions are largely associated with funds reaching for benchmark duration while holding cash portfolios tilted toward higher-return, lower-duration assets; and hedge funds frequently take the other side, adding leverage.] Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives as the primary source for the chain from benchmark duration-matching through futures to leveraged intermediation. Staff research, not a Board policy position. It does not establish that benchmark mechanics set the level of any yield, and is not used for that.

[Kruttli et al. 2021] Kruttli, M. S., Monin, P. J., Petrasek, L., & Watugala, S. W. (2021, June). Hedge Fund Treasury Trading and Funding Fragility: Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis. Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2021-038. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/hedge-fund-treasury-trading-and-funding-fragility-evidence-from-the-covid-19-crisis.htm. [The findings relied on: hedge-fund gross Treasury exposures roughly doubled from 2018 to February 2020, to about $2.4 trillion; funds concentrated in the cash–futures basis trade faced greater margin pressure and reduced Treasury exposures and repo borrowing the most during March 2020.] Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives for the stressed-regime behavior of leveraged Treasury intermediation. Staff research, not a Board policy position. Not used to attribute the March 2020 episode to benchmark demand, which neither paper claims.

[Rose 2021] Rose, J. (2021). Yield Curve Control in the United States, 1942 to 1951. Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 45(2). https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economic-perspectives/2021/2. PDF: https://www.chicagofed.org/-/media/publications/economic-perspectives/2021/ep2021-2-pdf.pdf. Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives and Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives for the 1942–1947 bill peg, the long-bond cap, and the 1951 Accord. Historical description; no inference about future policy is drawn from it.

[Jordà et al. 2017] Jordà, Ò., Schularick, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2017). Macrofinancial History and the New Business Cycle Facts. In M. Eichenbaum & J. A. Parker (Eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2016, vol. 31. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dataset: Jordà–Schularick–Taylor Macrohistory Database, release 6, https://www.macrohistory.net/database/. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives, which draws the database’s short-term rate less its CPI inflation for every country-year of 1945–1980 that has both.

[Brynjolfsson et al. 2026] Brynjolfsson, E., Chandar, B., & Chen, R. (2026, August 12; first circulated 2025). Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence. Working paper, Stanford Digital Economy Lab. https://digitaleconomy.stanford.edu/publications/canaries-in-the-coal-mine. Cited in Chapter 34: Objections & Responses for the direction of one finding, as stated in the abstract of the revision dated 12 August 2026: in ADP payroll data through June 2026, employment of workers aged 22–25 in AI-exposed occupations stands below where it would otherwise be. The authors describe the results as early and descriptive rather than causal. The headline figure has changed between versions, and none is used here. Working paper, not peer-reviewed.

Social / Disinformation / Deepfakes / Provenance

[Twitter Files 2022–23] “Twitter Files.” (2022–2023). Series of internal document releases published by independent journalists via the Twitter/X platform. [Primary documents; this thesis cites the releases as evidence of government–platform coordination, not as dispositive proof of any particular claim.] https://twitterfiles.substack.com/. Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives as evidence that coordination occurred; no individual claim in the releases is treated as established.

[House Judiciary 2023] U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary (Republican Staff). (2023, June 26). The Weaponization of CISA: How a “Cybersecurity” Agency Colluded with Big Tech and “Disinformation” Partners to Censor Americans. Interim Staff Report. https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/cisa-staff-report6-26-23.pdf. Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives as a partisan staff report that points to primary documents; evidence of public discourse, not an authority on any finding.

[State Dept. 2021–25] U.S. Department of State. (2021–2025). Global Engagement Center (GEC): About Us. U.S. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/about-us-global-engagement-center-2/. Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives as the agency’s own description of its mandate; primary source for the program’s existence, not for its effect.

[Harwell & Patton 2025] Harwell, D., & Patton, D. (2025, October 22). We uploaded a fake video to 8 social apps. Only one told users it wasn’t real. The Washington Post. [Seven of eight platforms tested stripped or failed to surface the C2PA Content Credentials attached to the upload; cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives.] https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/10/22/ai-deepfake-sora-platforms-c2pa/. One platform sweep on one date; cited for the stripping result, not as a base rate for platform behaviour.

[UNESCO 2025] UNESCO. (2025). Deepfakes and the Crisis of Knowing. UNESCO briefing. Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives for the “crisis of knowing” framing. https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/deepfakes-and-crisis-knowing.

[Ahmed et al. 2024] Ahmed, S., Bee, A. W. T., Ng, S. W. T., & Masood, M. (2024). Social Media News Use Amplifies the Illusory Truth Effects of Viral Deepfakes: A Cross-National Study of Eight Countries. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 68(5), 778–805. Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives: the eight-country survey evidence that prior deepfake exposure raises, rather than lowers, susceptibility. https://doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2024.2410783.

Policy Clock: EU AI Act

[EU 2024] European Union. (2024). Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal of the European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj. Cited in Appendix B: Practical KPIs & Telemetry Templates as a policy clock for provenance demand; the regulation’s dates only, no compliance claim.

Law & Regulation

[SEC 2023] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2023, December 13). Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies for U.S. Treasury Securities and Application of the Broker-Dealer Customer Protection Rule With Respect to U.S. Treasury Securities. Release No. 34-99149; compliance dates subsequently extended (2025) to December 31, 2026 for eligible cash transactions and June 30, 2027 for eligible repurchase transactions. https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2023/12/s7-23-22. Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives for the phase-in of central clearing as a change to the balance sheet each unit of Treasury intermediation consumes—a move in the capacity constraint, not its removal. Dates as published at the time of writing; the reader should check the current compliance schedule.

[SEC v. Howey 1946] Securities and Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/328/293/. Source of the four-element investment-contract test — investment of money, in a common enterprise, with a reasonable expectation of profit, derived from the efforts of others — against which Chapter 27: Legal, Policy, and Jurisdictional Posture reads the Value Capture Lemma’s own design commitments. Cited for the test as stated by the Court; subsequent SEC staff statements and case law that apply it to digital assets are discussed in that section and are not reproduced here.

[NIST 2026] NIST (Moody, D., Perlner, R., Regenscheid, A., Robinson, A., & Cooper, D.) (2026, October). Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (NIST IR 8547, final). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8547. Cited in Chapter 5: Threat Model for the transition dates: quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms, including ECDSA and EdDSA, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035.

Verification Asymmetry & PoUW (MatMul)

[Freivalds 1977] Freivalds, R. (1977). Probabilistic Machines Can Use Less Running Time. In Information Processing 77: Proceedings of IFIP Congress 77, pp. 839–842. Amsterdam: North-Holland. https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ifip/Freivalds77.html. The $O(n^{2})$ randomized check of a claimed matrix product $C = AB$ — pick a random vector $v$, compare $A(Bv)$ with $Cv$ — that Chapter 22: Layer 4: Truth & Work takes as the canonical M2 (algebraic or probabilistic) verification and Chapter 22: Layer 4: Truth & Work builds the MATMUL acceptance test on. A theorem, not a conjecture: soundness $\le 1/|\mathbb{F}|$ per round is proved. What remains conjectural (Komargodski et al., below) is the consensus-security property of a proof-of-useful-work built on it.

[Chesney & Citron 2019] Chesney, R., & Citron, D. K. (2019). Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security. California Law Review, 107(6), 1753–1820. https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38RV0D15J. Source of the term “liar’s dividend”: the benefit that accrues to a liar when the public knows fabrication is possible and so discounts authentic evidence. Cited in Chapter 3: The World Forces New Monetary Primitives.

[Fifth Circuit 2024] United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. (2024). Van Loon v. Department of the Treasury, No. 23-50669 (5th Cir. Nov. 26, 2024). Held that Tornado Cash’s immutable smart contracts are not “property” within the meaning of IEEPA and therefore could not be designated by OFAC. OFAC delisted the contracts on 21 March 2025. Cited in Chapter 27: Legal, Policy, and Jurisdictional Posture as the decision that defeated designation of the code. https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-50669-CV0.pdf.

[SDNY 2025] United States District Court, Southern District of New York. (2025). United States v. Storm, No. 1:23-cr-00430 (S.D.N.Y.). Jury verdict, 6 August 2025. Roman Storm convicted of conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money-transmitting business (18 U.S.C. §1960); jury did not reach a verdict on the money-laundering and sanctions-conspiracy counts. Cited in Chapter 27: Legal, Policy, and Jurisdictional Posture as the decision that did not defeat prosecution of the coders. Read together with Van Loon: non-custodial design protected the protocol, not its developers. https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67720764/united-states-v-storm/.

[Rechtbank Oost-Brabant 2024] Rechtbank Oost-Brabant. (2024). Judgment in the prosecution of Alexey Pertsev (Tornado Cash), May 2024. Conviction for money laundering in the Netherlands; cited in Chapter 27: Legal, Policy, and Jurisdictional Posture as the first developer conviction in the Tornado Cash sequence. Under appeal at the time of writing. https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/details?id=ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2024:2069.

[OFAC 2022] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). (2022, August 8). U.S. Treasury Sanctions Notorious Virtual Currency Mixer Tornado Cash. Press release. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916. The designation action whose reach over immutable code the Fifth Circuit later rejected. Cited in Chapter 27: Legal, Policy, and Jurisdictional Posture.

[OFAC 2025] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). (2025, March 21). Tornado Cash Delisting. Press release. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0057. The delisting that followed Van Loon; read with the Storm verdict, which the delisting did not prevent.

[FATF 2025] Financial Action Task Force (FATF). (2025). International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations, as amended; Recommendation 16 (wire transfers, the “Travel Rule”) and its 2019 extension to virtual assets and virtual-asset service providers. Paris: FATF. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/fatf-recommendations.html. Cited in Chapter 27: Legal, Policy, and Jurisdictional Posture for the Travel Rule obligations that bind intermediaries and not bearers.

[EU 2023] European Union. (2023). Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA). Official Journal of the European Union, L 150, 9 June 2023. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1114/oj. Cited in Chapter 27: Legal, Policy, and Jurisdictional Posture for the issuer- and service-provider obligations against which the bearer posture is compared.

[SEC 2025a] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance. (2025a). Statement on Certain Proof-of-Work Mining Activities. Staff statement, 20 March 2025. Non-binding staff view that certain protocol mining activities on public, permissionless PoW networks do not involve the offer and sale of securities. Cited in Chapter 27: Legal, Policy, and Jurisdictional Posture; the statement addresses the activity of mining under a fixed protocol, not a token whose fee routing is governance-adjustable. https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/statement-certain-proof-work-mining-activities-032025.

[SEC 2025b] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance. (2025b). Statement on Certain Protocol Staking Activities. Staff statement, 29 May 2025. Non-binding staff view that certain protocol staking activities do not involve the offer and sale of securities. Cited in Chapter 27: Legal, Policy, and Jurisdictional Posture with the same limitation as the mining statement: it speaks to the activity, not to holder-steered economics. https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/statement-certain-protocol-staking-activities-052925.

[SEC 2026a] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2026a). Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Certain Types of Crypto Assets and Certain Transactions Involving Crypto Assets. Interpretive release, Release Nos. 33-11412 and 34-105020, File No. S7-2026-09; issued 17 March 2026, effective 23 March 2026. Commission interpretation, joined by CFTC guidance. Cited in Chapter 27: Legal, Policy, and Jurisdictional Posture for: the Howey test is not superseded (§I); governance tokens as digital commodities (§III.A); how a non-security crypto asset becomes subject to, and separates from, an investment contract, with liability for unperformed promises (§IV); protocol mining and staking (§V). Primary source for the section’s frame; read 13 October 2026. https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/03/s7-2026-09.

[SEC Division of Corporation Finance 2026b] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance. (2026b). Frequently Asked Questions on Crypto Assets. Staff FAQ, issued 25 September 2026, updated 28 September 2026. Staff views with no legal force, not approved by the Commission. Cited in Chapter 27: Legal, Policy, and Jurisdictional Posture for Q2.5 on buyback programmes, protocol-funded burns included, which turns on the system being functional and having “no central party” (the latter added in the 28 September update). https://www.sec.gov/about/divisions-offices/division-corporation-finance/faqs-crypto-assets.

[Komargodski & Weinstein 2025] Komargodski, I., & Weinstein, O. (2025). Proofs of Useful Work from Arbitrary Matrix Multiplication. arXiv:2504.09971. https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.09971. Submitted April 2025; last revised November 2025 (v4; versions 1–3 also list I. Schen). Also in ESA 2026, LIPIcs 388, 2:1–2:17 (invited talk), https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2026.2. [Note: the optimal-security claim is described as a conjecture in the abstract, not a proven guarantee. The paper supports “promising research direction,” not “settled deployment.”]

[Pass 2026] Pass, R. (2026). The Economics of Proof-of-Useful-Work. arXiv:2606.06700. https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06700. Cited in Chapter 13: Why Hold the Base Asset? for the equilibrium analysis of proof-of-useful-work in which the useful-work buyer’s payment and the block subsidy compete for the same hardware, bearing directly on who pays for security when work has an external buyer. The thesis engages its regime analysis against its own fee-incidence result; no parameter is imported. The paper’s first-page footnote states: “This work was done while consulting for Pearl Research Labs.”

[Basu 2026] Basu, A. (2026). The Usefulness Gap in Proof-of-Useful-Work: An Empirical Study of Pearl’s cuPOW Protocol. arXiv:2606.04819 (v2, preprint under review). https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04819. Cited in Chapter 22: Layer 4: Truth & Work for the deployment date only: a MatMul proof-of-useful-work mainnet launched in approximately March 2026. Its measurements of useful output, which the author qualifies as not conclusive, are not used.

[Higham 2002] Higham, N. J. (2002). Accuracy and Stability of Numerical Algorithms (2nd ed.). Philadelphia: SIAM. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718027. Source of the componentwise backward-error bounds for floating-point matrix multiplication — $|C - AB| \le \gamma_{n}\,|A|\,|B|$ entrywise, with $\gamma_{n} = nu/(1-nu)$ for unit roundoff $u$ — on which the relative, componentwise, operand-normalized form of the MATMUL acceptance bound in Chapter 22: Layer 4: Truth & Work rests. Cited for the bound’s form; the acceptance tolerance is a publication choice pinned to a reference kernel, not a value taken from the book.

Hardware Assurance & Supply Chain (Layer 0 Prior Art)

[Becker et al. 2013] Becker, G. T., Regazzoni, F., Paar, C., & Burleson, W. P. (2013). Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems — CHES 2013, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8086. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40349-1_12. Cited in Chapter 17: Layer 0: Verifiable Machines & Energy for the existence of hardware trojans implemented by changing only dopant polarity, which are invisible to optical inspection and to imaging-based reverse engineering. It is the reason the sampling program’s detection bound carries a test-sensitivity term and is stated as a deterrent, not a bound, against this class; the bound is claimed only for counterfeit dies, binned-down parts, firmware substitution, and metering fraud.

[Chuang et al. 2026] Chuang, J., Seto, A., Berrios, N., van Schaik, S., Garman, C., & Genkin, D. (2026). TEE.fail: Breaking Trusted Execution Environments via DDR5 Memory Bus Interposition. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://tee.fail. Cited in Appendix E: Hardware Profiles for two findings stated on the project page: a DDR5 interposer setup costing under $1,000, and extraction of an Intel attestation key sufficient to produce TDX quotes that verify. No result about AMD attestation is used.

[Stoller & Osorio 2026] Stoller, C., & Osorio, M. (2026, March 4). OpenTitan Shipping in Production. Google Open Source Blog. https://opensource.googleblog.com/2026/03/opentitan-shipping-in-production.html. Cited in Chapter 17: Layer 0: Verifiable Machines & Energy for three statements in the post: OpenTitan is “now shipping in commercially available Chromebooks”; the first part “is being produced by Nuvoton”; and it is, in the post’s words, the “first commercially available open source RoT to support post-quantum cryptography (PQC) secure boot based on SLH-DSA”. A vendor announcement, cited as such. It names no process node, and nothing about open PDKs or fabrication is drawn from it.

ZKML / Verifiable ML

[Peng et al. 2025] Peng, Z., Wang, T., Zhao, C., et al. (2025). A Survey of Zero-Knowledge Proof Based Verifiable Machine Learning. arXiv:2502.18535. https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.18535. Cited in Chapter 20: Layer 3: Identity & Claims for the state of the art in zero-knowledge inference — practical at small scale, a research problem at frontier scale. Survey; no result beyond that maturity characterization is imported.

[Sun et al. 2024] Sun, H., Li, J., & Zhang, H. (2024). zkLLM: Zero Knowledge Proofs for Large Language Models. Proceedings of the 2024 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 4405–4419. https://doi.org/10.1145/3658644.3670334. Cited in Chapter 22: Layer 4: Truth & Work for one measurement (Table 1): a LLaMa-2-7B forward pass at sequence length 2,048 proved in 620 s on one NVIDIA A100 (40 GB), with a 2.36 s verifier. No production-readiness claim is drawn from it.

[Ong et al. 2025] Ong, J. M., Di Ferrante, M., Pazdera, A., Garner, R., Jaghouar, S., Basra, M., Ryabinin, M., & Hagemann, J. (2025). TOPLOC: A Locality Sensitive Hashing Scheme for Trustless Verifiable Inference. Proceedings of the 42nd International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR 267. arXiv:2501.16007v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.16007. Cited in Chapter 24: The Modular Stack for the proof size (“258 bytes of storage per 32 new tokens”), the authors’ statement that the method is robust across GPU types and algebraic reorderings, and its stated limitation (§6.2): it “is not capable of detecting speculative decoding”. The paper’s detection-accuracy figures are the authors’ empirical results and are not used.

[Prime Intellect Team 2025] Prime Intellect Team. (2025). INTELLECT-2: A Reasoning Model Trained Through Globally Decentralized Reinforcement Learning. arXiv:2505.07291 (v1). https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.07291. Cited in Chapter 24: The Modular Stack for production use of TOPLOC (§2.3.1: each inference worker generates a proof for every generated sequence, which a trusted validator node checks) and for the token-sampling check aimed at a smaller model generating behind a larger one’s prefill (§2.3.2). A project report, read as the arXiv preprint.

FHE / FHE Rollups / OpenFHE / Fhenix

[Zyskind et al. 2024] Zyskind, G., Erez, Y., Langer, T., Grossman, I., & Bondarevsky, L. (2024). FHE-Rollups: Scaling Confidential Smart Contracts on Ethereum and Beyond. Proceedings of BSCI ’24. ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/3659463.3660031. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[OpenFHE 2025] OpenFHE Project. (2025). OpenFHE v1.4.0 – Development Release Announcement. GitHub. https://github.com/openfheorg/openfhe-development. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[Fhenix 2023] Fhenix. (2023). Introducing FHE-Rollups: Scaling Confidential Smart Contracts on Ethereum and Beyond. Fhenix blog. https://www.fhenix.io/blog/introducing-fhe-rollups-scaling-confidential-smart-contracts-on-ethereum-and-beyond. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[Zama 2025] Zama. (2025, December 30). Zama Protocol Is on Mainnet. Zama Community Forum. https://community.zama.org/t/zama-protocol-is-on-mainnet/4124. Landscape reference; not cited in the text. A vendor post: “The Zama Protocol is on mainnet”, with “the first confidential stablecoin (cUSDT) transfer on Ethereum”. No throughput figure is taken from it or from Zama’s other documents.

[Unchained 2026] Unchained. (2026, October 21). Fhenix Goes Live on Ethereum and Arbitrum, Letting Contracts Compute on Hidden Balances. https://unchainedcrypto.com/fhenix-goes-live-on-ethereum-and-arbitrum-letting-contracts-compute-on-hidden-balances/. Landscape reference; not cited in the text. Secondary report of the company’s statement that its CoFHE coprocessor is “now live on Ethereum and Arbitrum mainnet”, having previously run only on public test networks. The article states that it was produced with AI assistance and reviewed by an editor. Fhenix’s own site summary (https://www.fhenix.io/llms.txt, read 30 October 2026) gives the same date and adds that mainnet access “is permissioned at launch”, through an allowlist.

Bitcoin Transport Privacy (BIP-324, Core 27.0)

[Bitcoin Core 2024] Bitcoin Core Developers. (2024, April 17). Bitcoin Core Version 27.0 Released. BitcoinCore.org. https://bitcoincore.org/en/releases/27.0/. Cited in Chapter 18: Layer 1: Reachability for the release that enabled BIP-324 by default. A release note, cited as fact.

[Mehta et al. 2023] Mehta, D., Ruffing, T., Schnelli, J., & Wuille, P. (2023). BIP-324: Version 2 P2P Encrypted Transport Protocol. Bitcoin Improvement Proposals. https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0324.mediawiki. Cited in Chapter 18: Layer 1: Reachability, Appendix F: Communications Resilience Mechanisms, and Appendix A: Formal Model of Verification Asymmetry & VerifyPrice as the wire-format template for encrypted peer transport. A specification; nothing beyond its text is claimed.

Lightning Receiver Privacy (BOLT12 Offers)

[NoBS Bitcoin 2024a] No Bullshit Bitcoin. (2024, July 4). Phoenix Wallet v2.3.1 & Phoenixd v0.2.0: BOLT12 Offers. NoBSBitcoin.com. https://www.nobsbitcoin.com/phoenix-wallet-v2-3-1-phoenixd-v0-2-0/. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[NoBS Bitcoin 2024b] No Bullshit Bitcoin. (2024, September 24). BOLT12: Offers Officially Merged into Lightning Specification. https://www.nobsbitcoin.com/bolt12-offers-officially-merged-into-lightning-spec/. Cited in Chapter 18: Layer 1: Reachability and Appendix F: Communications Resilience Mechanisms for the date BOLT12 Offers merged into the Lightning specification. Secondary reporting of a specification event.

Ecash / Federations (Fedimint / Fedi)

[Bitcoin Magazine 2025] Bitcoin Magazine. (2025, October 29). From Stealth to Scale: Fedi Unveils Multi-Sig Guardians for Federated Bitcoin Ecash Mints. https://bitcoinmagazine.com/business/from-stealth-to-scale-fedi-unveils-multi-sig-guardians-for-federated-bitcoin-e-cash-mints. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[Fedimint Project 2024–25] Fedimint Project. (2024–2025). What Does the Federation Do? Fedimint documentation. https://fedimint.org. Cited in Chapter 18: Layer 1: Reachability, Chapter 29: Adoption Curve & Ecosystem Dynamics, and Chapter 34: Objections & Responses for what a federation does. Project documentation, read here as federated custody rather than in the project’s own framing.

Privacy Rails: Zcash, BTC$\leftrightarrow$XMR Swaps

[Hopwood et al. 2026] Hopwood, D.-E., Bowe, S., Hornby, T., & Wilcox, N. (2026). Zcash Protocol Specification [NU6.3]. Version v2026.7.0-399-gff594d, dated 30 October 2026 (the copy read; ZIP 258 cites version 2026.8.0 [NU6.3] or later). https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf. Cited in Chapter 23: Layer 5: Value & Settlement for what the shielded pool does and does not offer — in particular, no adaptor-compatible signing path — which is why the BTC$\leftrightarrow$shielded-ZEC corridor is gated, and for the overview’s statement that transfers of transparent value “have the same privacy properties” as in Bitcoin. From NU6.3 the specification lists the Ironwood pool among the deployed shielded pools, using the same shielded protocol as the Orchard pool. The protocol specification as the authority on the protocol.

[Hopwood 2026] Hopwood, D.-E. (2026). ZIP 258: Deployment of the NU6.3 Network Upgrade (status: Final). Zcash Improvement Proposals. https://zips.z.cash/zip-0258. Cited in Chapter 23: Layer 5: Value & Settlement for what the ZIP states: NU6.3 introduces the Ironwood shielded pool, its Mainnet activation height is 3428143, and after it “the Orchard pool can only be spent from (not added to)”, so that newly created shielded value is directed into the Ironwood pool. Read 30 October 2026.

[Zcash 2026] Zcash. (2026, July 19). Orchard Action circuit soundness failure (under-constrained base in halo2_gadgets) enables counterfeiting within the Orchard pool. GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-ghc3-g8w4-whf9. https://github.com/zcash/zcash/security/advisories/GHSA-ghc3-g8w4-whf9. Cited in Chapter 30: Risk Analysis & Failure Modes for two statements in the advisory: the flaw “could have permitted counterfeiting (minting) of funds within the Orchard shielded pool,” and “it is not possible to verify after the fact whether counterfeiting occurred during the exposure window.” The advisory credits the ZIP 209 turnstile with bounding outflows from the pool.

[Hopwood & Grigg 2025] Hopwood, D.-E., & Grigg, J. (2025). ZIP 2005: Ironwood Quantum Recoverability (status: Proposed). Zcash Improvement Proposals. https://zips.z.cash/zip-2005. Cited in Chapter 5: Threat Model for one statement: note encryption for the Zcash shielded pools is subject to “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” attacks by an attacker holding the on-chain ciphertext and the receiver’s address. The ZIP’s own header still reads Proposed; ZIP 258 (status: Final) states that it activates at NU6.3 on each network.

[Gugger 2020] Gugger, J. (h4sh3d). (2020). Bitcoin–Monero Cross-chain Atomic Swap. Protocol paper. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/1126. https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1126. The adaptor-signature construction for atomic swaps between a scriptable chain (Bitcoin) and a scriptless one (Monero) that Chapter 23: Layer 5: Value & Settlement’s BTC$\leftrightarrow$XMR corridor takes as its operative reference. The protocol paper; the implementation is the following entry.

[Rucknium 2025] Rucknium. (2025, September 26). Monero’s 18-block reorg: What happened, why it matters, and what does it have to do with the annoying 10-block lock? https://rucknium.me/posts/monero-18-block-reorg/. Cited in Chapter 23: Layer 5: Value & Settlement for the event: an 18-block reorganization on 14 September 2025 that invalidated 115 transactions from the original chain. Analyst post; no claim about attribution is used.

[COMIT 2021] COMIT Network. (2021). xmr-btc-swap: Bitcoin–Monero Atomic Swap Implementation. GitHub. https://github.com/comit-network/xmr-btc-swap. The open-source implementation of the Gugger protocol, with its refund and punish transaction flows; the descendants listed below build on it.

[UnstoppableSwap 2025] UnstoppableSwap / eigenwallet. (2025). UnstoppableSwap GUI / eigenwallet: Non-custodial XMR$\leftrightarrow$BTC Atomic Swaps. GitHub. https://github.com/eigenwallet/core. Cited in Chapter 23: Layer 5: Value & Settlement as a production descendant of the COMIT implementation. Existence and lineage only.

[Zodl Support 2026] Zodl Support (Znewco, Inc.). (2026). Swapping into ZEC. Help article, last updated 6 September 2026. https://support.zodl.com/article/26-swapping-into-zec. Cited in Chapter 23: Layer 5: Value & Settlement for how one wallet’s swap into shielded ZEC works: market makers on NEAR Intents compete to fill the order, “settlement is enforced on-chain by smart contract”, the ZEC is “deposited directly to a fresh shielded address”, and the user sends a deposit and supplies a refund address for a failed swap. A vendor support page; no volume or reliability figure is used.

[Maya Protocol 2026] Maya Protocol. (2026). /mayachain/inbound_addresses. Live node endpoint, read 30 October 2026. https://mayanode.mayachain.info/mayachain/inbound_addresses. Cited in Chapter 23: Layer 5: Value & Settlement for two fields of the ZEC entry as read: a transparent (t1) vault address, and a shielded-memo configuration that publishes the vault’s unified incoming viewing key with trial decryption enabled. A live endpoint whose vault address rotates; no address is quoted. [Buterin et al. 2023] Buterin, V., Illum, J., Nadler, M., Schär, F., & Soleimani, A. (2023). Blockchain Privacy and Regulatory Compliance: Towards a Practical Equilibrium. SSRN Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4563364. Cited in Chapter 23: Layer 5: Value & Settlement for association sets: a user can prove that their own inputs to a withdrawal belong to (or are excluded from) a published set without revealing which, which is why “none of my inputs is in exclusion set $E$” is provable while taint-at-distance is not.

Zcash Roadmap / NU7 Discussions

[Zcash Forum 2024–25] Zcash Community Forum. (2024–2025). Accelerate NU7: Let’s Deliver a Smaller Network Upgrade Sooner. Governance thread. https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/accelerate-nu7-let-s-deliver-a-smaller-network-upgrade-sooner/51916. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

Ethereum Privacy L2 (Aztec)

[Steinrueck & Sammara 2025] Steinrueck, D., & Sammara, A. (2025, May 2). Testnet Retro – Launch Day: Aztec Public Testnet Went Live. Aztec Network blog. https://aztec.network/blog/testnet-retro---launch-day. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[CoinDesk 2025] Coindesk. (2025, May 1). “Everything Is Encrypted”: Aztec’s Privacy Rollup Hits Testnet Amid Growing Demand. https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2025/05/01/everything-is-encrypted-aztec-s-privacy-rollup-hits-testnet-amid-growing-demand. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[Aztec Labs 2026] Aztec Labs. (2026). Alpha Network. Aztec documentation, read 30 October 2026. https://docs.aztec.network/participate/alpha. Landscape reference; not cited in the text. Project documentation: Alpha “is the Aztec mainnet in its initial operational phase” and “early, unaudited software where bugs, including critical ones, are expected”; the same page states that some circuits “are still under-constrained, meaning that soundness is not fully guaranteed.”

IBC-Wide Shielding (Namada)

[Namada 2025] Namada Team. (2025, June 20). Namada Mainnet Launch Is Complete! Namada blog. https://namada.net/blog/namada-mainnet-launch-is-complete. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[Namada 2023] Namada Team. (2023, January 31). Understanding the MASP and CC Circuits. Namada blog. https://namada.net/blog/understanding-the-masp-and-cc-circuits. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

Proof Markets / PoUW / Privacy-First L1s

[Aleo 2025] Aleo. (2025). Consensus and Proof of Succinct Work (PoSW). Aleo developer documentation. https://docs.aleo.org/learn/network/nodes/provers. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[Boundless 2025] RISC Zero / Boundless. (2025). Boundless: A Universal ZK Compute Layer. Binance Research report; the report page is not stably linkable, so the protocol documentation is given instead. https://docs.boundless.network. Cited in Appendix E: Hardware Profiles for the market’s auction structure. Documentation; no price is adopted from it.

[Shankar 2026] Shankar, S. (2026, February 26). The cost of proving is now $0.02 per billion cycles, an all time low since Mainnet launch in Q4. LinkedIn post (Boundless Network CEO). https://www.linkedin.com/posts/shiv-shankar_the-cost-of-proving-is-now-002-per-billion-activity-7432854966572244992-GIK-. Cited in Appendix E: Hardware Profiles for the February 2026 Boundless auction reading (USD 0.02 per $10^{9}$ cycles; roughly 400 trillion cycles per day of posted capacity). A vendor statement about a market price, cited as such; it is offered as evidence of oversupply in open proving auctions, not as a cost of proving.

[Boundless 2026] Boundless Foundation. (2026, October 19). ZKC: The AI Access Coin. Blog post. https://boundless.network/blog/zkc-the-ai-access-coin/. Cited in Appendix E: Hardware Profiles for one statement: “The Boundless ZK proving protocol will pause operations on November 5, 2026.” The stated reasons are not used.

[Succinct 2026] Succinct Labs. (2026). Succinct Prover Network documentation: Proof Contests; FAQ (pricing in prover gas units). https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/protocol/spn/auction. Cited in Appendix E: Hardware Profiles for the auction-set price per PGU plus dynamic base fee.

[Succinct 2025] Succinct Labs. (2025, August 5). Succinct Prover Network Mainnet Launch (PROVE). https://blog.succinct.foundation/mainnet/. Cited in Appendix E: Hardware Profiles for the mainnet launch date. Announcement only.

[Gold 2025] Gold, S. (2025, July 10). Shipping an L1 zkEVM #1: Realtime Proving. Ethereum Foundation Blog. https://blog.ethereum.org/2025/07/10/realtime-proving. Cited in Appendix E: Hardware Profiles for the Foundation’s working definition of real-time proving (latency at most 10 s for the 99th percentile of mainnet blocks; on-premises capital expenditure at most USD 100,000; on-premises power at most 10 kW; at least 128 bits of security; proofs at most 300 KiB with no trusted setups) and for the plan to begin by giving validators the option to run clients that verify proofs instead of re-executing blocks.

[Kadianakis 2025] Kadianakis, G. (2025, December 18). Shipping an L1 zkEVM #2: The Security Foundations. Ethereum Foundation Blog. https://blog.ethereum.org/2025/12/18/zkevm-security-foundations. Cited in Appendix E: Hardware Profiles for one sentence, the Foundation’s own account of the year’s progress: “proving latency dropped from 16 minutes to 16 seconds, costs collapsed 45$\times$, and zkVMs now prove 99% of all Ethereum blocks in under 10 seconds on target hardware.” Self-reported, not independently measured.

[Thaler 2025] Thaler, J. (2025, March 11). The Path to Secure and Efficient zkVMs: How to Track Progress. a16z crypto. https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/secure-efficient-zkvms-progress/. Cited in Appendix E: Hardware Profiles for two statements: zkVM provers “incur overhead factors approaching one million times the cost of native execution”, as they did “roughly one year ago”; and GPU acceleration and pre-compiles yield speedups that “don’t necessarily reflect progress on fundamental overheads”. The author’s estimate, not a benchmark.

[Beiko et al. 2025] Beiko, T., Stokes, A., Dietrichs, A., Nixo, & Jayanthi, P. (2025). EIP-8081: Hardfork Meta – Hegotá (status: Draft; created 11 November 2025). Ethereum Improvement Proposals. https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-8081. Cited in Appendix E: Hardware Profiles for one listing: EIP-8025, Optional Execution Proofs, under “Declined for Inclusion”. The same list declines EIP-8182, Private ETH and ERC-20 Transfers, recorded here as landscape for Ethereum base-layer privacy. A Draft meta-EIP whose lists change; read 30 October 2026.

[Nockchain 2025] Nockchain Foundation. (2025). Nockchain Is Now Open Source; Nockchain Issuance Schedule and Dumbnet Launch. Nockchain.org. https://www.nockchain.org/writings/nockchain-is-now-open-source. Issuance schedule: https://www.nockchain.org/writings/nockchain-issuance-schedule-and-updated-launch-target. Cited in Chapter 1: Introduction, Chapter 29: Adoption Curve & Ecosystem Dynamics, and Chapter 31: Implementation Sketches for Builders as a design pattern — zk-PoW with explicit issuance — and not as an endorsement of the project or its token; no quantity is adopted.

[Psy Protocol 2025] Psy Protocol (formerly QED). (2025). Psy: A Scalable, Privacy-First L1 Secured by Proof-of-Useful-Work 2.0. https://psy.xyz/docs. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[Bittensor 2025] Bittensor. (2025). Yuma Consensus. Bittensor Docs. https://docs.bittensor.com. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[Ambient 2024] Ambient. (2024). Ambient Litepaper v1: Proof of Logits and Consensus. https://ambient.xyz/Ambient_Litepaper_V1.pdf.

Transport, Privacy, SDKs & Related Infrastructure

[NoBS Bitcoin 2023] No Bullshit Bitcoin. (2023, July 11). The New Phoenix: A 3rd Generation Lightning Wallet. https://www.nobsbitcoin.com/he-new-phoenix-a-3rd-generation-lightning-wallet/. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[Fedimint 2025] Fedimint. (2025). Fedimint Lightning Gateway Uses LDK Node to Simplify Deployment and Liquidity Management. Lightning Dev Kit blog. https://lightningdevkit.org/blog/fedimint-lightning-gateway-uses-ldk-node-to-simplify-deployment-and-liquidity-management. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

Ethereum Privacy Roadmaps (PSE / Privacy Cluster)

[PSE 2025] Privacy Stewards of Ethereum (PSE). (2025, September 12). PSE Roadmap: 2025 and Beyond. PSE.dev blog. https://pse.dev/blog/pse-roadmap-2025. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[Ethereum Foundation 2025] Ethereum Foundation. (2025, October 8). The Ethereum Foundation’s Commitment to Privacy. Ethereum.org blog. https://blog.ethereum.org/2025/10/08/privacy-commitment. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

[CoinMarketCap 2025] CoinMarketCap Academy. (2025, October 9). Ethereum Foundation Launches Privacy Cluster for Enhanced Blockchain Security. https://coinmarketcap.com/academy/article/ethereum-foundation-launches-privacy-cluster-for-enhanced-blockchain-security. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

Vitalik on Openness & Verifiable Hardware

[Buterin 2025] Buterin, V. (2025, September 24). The Importance of Full-Stack Openness and Verifiability. Personal blog (vitalik.eth.limo). https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2025/09/24/openness_and_verifiability.html. Landscape reference; not cited in the text.

C2PA / Provenance (Supporting)

[C2PA spec] Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). Content Credentials: C2PA Technical Specification. A Joint Development Foundation project of the Linux Foundation; founding members Adobe, Arm, Intel, Microsoft, Truepic, and the BBC. https://c2pa.org.

Identity Credentials (Layer 3 Prior Art)

[EU Digital Identity Wallet 2026] EU Digital Identity Wallet project. (2026). Age Verification Solution Technical Specification: Operational, Security, Product, and Architecture Specifications (§4.2), and Annex B, Zero Knowledge Proofs for the Age Verification Solution. GitHub repository eu-digital-identity-wallet/av-doc-technical-specification, main branch read 30 October 2026 (latest tag v1.0.6). https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/av-doc-technical-specification. Cited in Chapter 20: Layer 3: Identity & Claims for: an age-verification app “SHALL implement the Zero-Knowledge Proof mechanism …as the preferred presentation method” and the plain ISO mDoc presentation “as a fallback for devices that do not support Zero-Knowledge Proofs” (§4.2), with plain mDoc presentations treated as single-use and proofs as unlinkable; Annex B’s report that external reviews of the selected scheme found “under-constrained witness variables affecting soundness” and that “all reported findings have been addressed”; and Annex B’s statement that the scheme “is deployed in Google Wallet”, which is relayed here, not read at Google’s source. No deployment of the EU app itself is claimed.

Software Update Security & Transparency (Layer 2 Prior Art)

[TUF 2011–] The Update Framework (TUF). (2011–). The Update Framework: A Framework for Securing Software Update Systems. specification and reference implementations, theupdateframework.io. https://theupdateframework.io. The supply-chain invariants I1–I5 in Chapter 19: Layer 2: Distribution & Execution (threshold signatures, freshness/anti-rollback, reproducibility, compromise response, multi-path availability) restate, in protocol-specific form, guarantees TUF established for package repositories; Uptane (Kuppusamy et al., 2016–present) adapts the same framework to automotive update streams.

[Kuppusamy et al. 2016] Kuppusamy, T. K., Brown, A., Awwad, S., McCoy, D., Bielawski, R., Mott, C., Lauzon, S., Weimerskirch, A., & Cappos, J. (2016). Uptane: Securing Software Updates for Automobiles. In Proceedings of the 14th Embedded Security in Cars Conference (ESCAR Europe). https://uptane.org. The automotive adaptation of TUF: compromise-resilient update delivery to fleets of heterogeneous devices with an offline root, image and director repositories, and partial-verification clients. Cited as the closest prior deployment of the multi-role, multi-path update pipeline Chapter 19: Layer 2: Distribution & Execution specifies for a monetary client.

[Laurie et al. 2013] Laurie, B., Langley, A., & Kasper, E. (2013). Certificate Transparency. RFC 6962, IETF. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962. The append-only, publicly auditable release log of Chapter 19: Layer 2: Distribution & Execution is the CT construction applied to software artifacts; witness cosigning in the style of Sigsum (sigsum.org) is the lightweight variant.

[Reproducible Builds 2014–] Reproducible Builds Project. (2014–). Reproducible Builds: Setting the Record Straight and associated specifications. reproducible-builds.org. https://reproducible-builds.org.

Censorship Measurement & Circumvention (Layer 1 Prior Art)

[OONI 2012–] Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI). (2012–). OONI Probe and Measurement Methodology. ooni.org. https://ooni.org. The VerifyReach measurement design (Chapter 18: Layer 1: Reachability) — volunteer vantage points, canary requests, geographic/ASN stratification, public aggregation with p50/p95 reporting — follows the measurement methodology OONI has operated at scale for over a decade; the divergence triggers and WC-incentivized vantage pool are the extensions.

[Dingledine et al. 2004] Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P. (2004). Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router. Proceedings of USENIX Security ’04. https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec04/tech/dingledine.html. Tor and I2P as first-class transports (Chapter 18: Layer 1: Reachability) are prior deployments of the transport-agility and receiver-privacy principles; pluggable transports are the obfuscation layer referenced by “obfs-class shims.”

[Wu et al. 2023] Wu, M., Sippe, J., Sivakumar, D., Burg, J., Anderson, P., Wang, X., Bock, K., Houmansadr, A., Levin, D., & Ensafi, R. (2023). How the Great Firewall of China Detects and Blocks Fully Encrypted Traffic. In Proceedings of the 32nd USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX Association. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/wu-mingshi. PDF: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity23-wu-mingshi.pdf. Cited in Chapter 18: Layer 1: Reachability and Appendix F: Communications Resilience Mechanisms for the finding that the GFW has, since late 2021, blocked fully encrypted (uniform-random-bytes) transports heuristically — by entropy and printable-byte tests on the first packet — so that “looks like nothing” is itself a fingerprint. It is why the transport set separates encrypted transports from look-like-something transports and carries mimicry (look-like-TLS), Snowflake, and refraction (Conjure) fallbacks.

[Fanti et al. 2018] Fanti, G., Venkatakrishnan, S. B., Bakshi, S., Denby, B., Bhargava, S., Miller, A., & Viswanath, P. (2018). Dandelion++: Lightweight Cryptocurrency Networking with Formal Anonymity Guarantees. Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems (SIGMETRICS), 2(2), Article 29. https://doi.org/10.1145/3224424. Cited in Chapter 18: Layer 1: Reachability for two-phase transaction relay—an anonymity phase along a random privacy graph followed by ordinary diffusion—which bounds the first-spy estimator’s advantage against mempool and gossip surveillance. Encrypted links do not address this threat; relay topology does.

[Frolov et al. 2019] Frolov, S., Wampler, J., Tan, S. C., Halderman, J. A., Borisov, N., & Wustrow, E. (2019). Conjure: Summoning Proxies from Unused Address Space. In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’19). ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363218. Cited in Chapter 18: Layer 1: Reachability as the deployed form of refraction networking: a cooperating transit ISP redirects flows addressed to unused address space in its range, so that the censor sees a connection to a decoy and blocking it means blocking the ISP. Listed as a first-class look-like-something fallback beside Snowflake and domain fronting.

[DoD 1989] U.S. Department of Defense. (1989). MIL-STD-105E: Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by Attributes. Superseded for civilian use by ANSI/ASQ Z1.4 (2003, reaffirmed 2018), Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by Attributes. American Society for Quality. https://quicksearch.dla.mil/qsDocDetails.aspx?ident_number=35496. Cited in Chapter 17: Layer 0: Verifiable Machines & Energy as the sampling precedent for the Layer 0 lot-inspection program: lot-by-lot attribute sampling with a published plan and a stated consumer’s risk, in place of full inspection. Replaces the earlier and incorrect appeal to Lloyd’s Register as a sampling precedent; Lloyd’s classification was a per-vessel survey and is retained only as the precedent for a published, paid-for, third-party grade that underwriters price off.

[Turan et al. 2018] Turan, M. S., Barker, E., Kelsey, J., McKay, K. A., Baish, M. L., & Boyle, M. (2018). Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation (NIST Special Publication 800-90B). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90B. Cited in Chapter 17: Layer 0: Verifiable Machines & Energy for the min-entropy estimators applied to a raw noise source, which is the correct test for an entropy source; statistical-randomness suites (SP 800-22, Dieharder, TestU01) test conditioned output and cannot certify a source. The Layer 0 RNG stress test applies 800-90B to the source and Dieharder/TestU01 to the conditioned output, not the reverse.

Sourcing Note

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